Standing Committee A

[Mr. Win Griffiths in the Chair]

Homelessness Bill

Clause 3 - Homelessness strategies

Andrew Selous: I beg to move amendment No. 4, in page 2, line 30, after 'homelessness', insert '(including rough sleeping)'.

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 1—Rough sleepers—
 'The Rough Sleepers Unit shall cease to operate with effect from April 2002, and its powers and responsibilities shall be devolved to local housing authorities.'.

Andrew Selous: I am pleased to be a member of this Standing Committee discussing homelessness, on which I made my maiden speech. I referred in that speech to some of the homeless charities that deal with rough sleepers, a subject dealt with in this amendment and the proposed new clause.
 First, I should declare an interest to the Committee. Some time ago, Mr. Lee, one of our distinguished Clerks, was a tenant of mine. I hope that he would confirm that I was in the model landlord category. 
 The amendment and the new clause would make certain that local housing authorities ensure that their strategy specifically includes the prevention of rough sleeping. That would render the rough sleepers unit redundant. The responsibility for dealing with rough sleepers should be transferred to local authorities—they are more in touch with the problems in their districts than the rough sleepers unit can hope to be. 
 The amendment is important because I know from my constituency surgery, that little provision is available for families who face possible eviction and sleeping on the streets after they have been evicted from private rented accommodation and offered 28 days bed-and-breakfast accommodation. I would be interested to hear the Minister's comments on a case of that kind in my constituency. A lady in the circumstances that I have described came to see me. She has been evicted from private rented accommodation and offered 28 days bed-and-breakfast accommodation. She is expecting her fifth child on the day before she will be forced out of the bed-and-breakfast accommodation, so she came to ask me what would happen. I understand that, in the eyes of the law, she is considered to be intentionally homeless. However, that still leaves me in a difficult position as to how I should advise her. Will the Bill make a difference in her case? 
 District councils and their metropolitan or unitary counterparts should be able to put applicants in contact with sufficient numbers of providers of emergency accommodation to meet their local needs. That is what I would have expected to happen in the case of the lady who came to my surgery. In Committee this morning, the Minister spoke about local authorities having telephone and fax numbers and e-mail addresses of organisations in their locality who could provide such emergency housing services. However, a senior officer of the council involved in the case I have mentioned told me that that was not the case. A database needs to be created containing such information nationally, so that we can give the best possible advice to people in such circumstances. 
 New clause 1 would bring to an end the rough sleepers unit and allow that budget of some £198 million to be transferred to the local housing authorities in proportion to the level of rough sleeping in their areas. That was envisaged by the then Under-Secretary in part II of the Homes Bill. It would allow the budget of £198 million to go directly to the local authorities over three years. The administration budget of £3.6 million is included in that, as are the salaries of the senior staff: I gather that Louise Casey has earned between £70,000 and £75,000, that her deputy earned about £54,000, and that the third most senior member of staff earned between £45,000 and £60,000. All that money would then become available to go directly to the local authorities that assist rough sleepers in their areas. 
 In the previous Parliament, when the hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin) was the Minister, he told the Committee that he envisaged that responsibility for rough sleeping would be returned to local housing authorities. I trust that that is still the Government's position.

Sally Keeble: I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Griffiths, and I am grateful that you were able to step into the breach at such short notice. I have been told that this is the first time that you have chaired a Committee, and it is nice to have a little seniority over you, as I now have a morning's experience behind me.
 Clause 3 is vital. It requires local housing authorities to take a multi-agency and strategic approach to preventing, and responding to, homelessness. It sets out the basis for such a strategy, and it requires that such strategies are kept under review. Many different agencies are involved with people who are homeless, or at risk of becoming so, and it is important that they work together to avoid duplicating their services, which might create gaps in provision. 
 When local housing authorities conduct reviews and draft strategies, they should work with other authorities and agencies, such as social services authorities or departments, health service organisations, and those administering housing benefit. 
 Registered social landlords will also be central to the development and implementation of homelessness strategies. Multi-agency co-operation is to be encouraged because it is recognised that agencies might have clients in common, and that many of the services that they provide can contribute to the prevention and management of homelessness. 
 The purpose of the strategy is set out in subsection (1). Local housing authorities must make plans to prevent homelessness in their districts, to secure sufficient accommodation and provide support for people who are homeless, and to provide support for people who might become homeless. They must also help people who 
``need support to prevent them becoming homeless again.'' 
That is called the revolving door syndrome. 
 A strategic approach by housing authorities to the prevention of homelessness and to the management of its consequences is central to improving the lot of many of society's most vulnerable members. That will be greatly enhanced by multi-agency co-operation to address the needs of individuals, and I welcome the widespread agreement to that approach. 
 I referred to amendment No. 4 earlier in the debate. It seeks to make it explicit that rough sleeping is included in the term homelessness, and I assure hon. Members that that is already the case. The code of guidance will make it clear that authorities will need to take account of rough sleeping in their reviews and strategies. 
 New clause 1 would disband the rough sleepers unit and give local authorities the primary responsibility for addressing the problems of rough sleeping. 
 The hon. Member for South-West Bedfordshire (Mr. Selous) made a point about a lady who visited his constituency advice surgery, and I want to respond to it. From the description that he gave, it was unclear how she would be judged by the local authority, and I do not want to hazard a guess about that, as I might get the answer wrong. When one looks through the details of such a case, it is easy to miss out a couple of factors that can affect whether a person is intentionally, or unintentionally, homeless, and that affects all that person's subsequent rights. I have a suggestion to make to the hon. Gentleman. Some excellent handbooks have been published that might help him and, when he has been a Member of Parliament for a little longer, he will begin to realise that judgments of this type must be made by local authorities and that we have to give our constituents advice on them. That would be far better than my hazarding a judgment on the brief facts presented by the hon. Gentleman. 
 There is no reason why families with children should have to sleep rough. If they are unable to find accommodation themselves, they can seek help from social services authorities. Although it is said that rough sleeping is the same as homelessness, there is quite a difference between the two. I have not come across a family or a person in the circumstances that the hon. Gentleman described who ended up sleeping rough on the streets. Although they may not have had the most desirable accommodation, they would not have ended up sleeping on the streets. 
 I am pleased that the Conservative party shares the Government's concerns about the plight of people sleeping rough. The hon. Member for South-West Bedfordshire expressed his interest in the subject on Second Reading; it is a matter that seems to unite members of the Committee. 
 The hon. Gentleman's probing amendment is probably designed to discover the Government's intentions for the future of the rough sleepers unit, which was established on 1 April 1999. It had the specific objective of reducing the number of people sleeping rough in England to as near zero as possible, or by at least two thirds, by April 2002. The unit has already made excellent progress against that demanding target. It takes a partnership approach, delivered through a national strategy. 
 The unit's work draws together different programmes from across the statutory sector. It takes a joined-up approach to considering why people sleep rough and offering them an alternative to life on the streets, working across Government to ensure that all organisations with a stake in the problem—local authorities, the Prison Service, the Benefits Agency and the armed forces—do their bit to tackle the problem, considering prevention as well as cure. Some of the work that is done with agencies and Government Departments would be extremely difficult if it was merely devolved to local authorities, which would not come up with the innovative policies devised by the rough sleepers unit. 
 Figures show that between June 1998 and June 2000 the number of people sleeping rough on any one night across England had fallen by more than one third. In June 2000, there were an estimated 1,180 people sleeping rough on a single night. It is essential that the Government are responsible for addressing the problem of people sleeping rough. The new clause would cut short much of the unit's successful work and pass responsibility for tackling the problem of rough sleeping entirely to local authorities. That would not be remotely in the interests of people sleeping rough and it would not support the agencies' constructive work to help the vulnerable people who sleep on the streets. 
 The rough sleepers unit has begun consulting on a future strategy. The consultation will consider how to take forward measures to end rough sleeping and to prevent people ending up on the streets in the first place. That should continue once the unit has met its target in April 2002. The role of local authorities will be one factor in the analysis. They will need to build on their present successes in reducing the number of people sleeping rough, to ensure that numbers are sustained at a low level and do not start to creep up to the previous historic levels. 
 The rough sleepers unit consultation process will take into account what role local authorities should play after 2002. I therefore ask the hon. Member for South-West Bedfordshire to withdraw the amendment and not to press the new clause. 
 Tim Loughton (East Worthing and Shoreham): I wish to ask the Minister a few questions, especially in response to her query about new clause 1 and the future of the rough sleepers unit. When responding to similar amendments that we tabled to the pre-run of the Bill, her predecessor, the hon. Member for Sunderland, South, said: 
``it is not intended that the unit should become a permanent fixture. Work is already under way to develop an exit strategy . . . It is envisaged that eventually the unit will be wound up and responsibility will be passed back to local authorities.''—[Official Report, Standing Committee D, 25 January 2001; c. 310.] 
 The Minister described the work of the rough sleepers unit as unique. As she sees it, what it is achieving could not be achieved if such work were devolved to local authorities. However, such action would only devolve it back because such functions were carried out by local authorities in the first place. Is the hon. Lady saying that the rough sleepers unit is still on track to be wound up after April 2002, as the previous Minister promised? Has such a decision been taken? 
 The Minister mentioned—I think that she was repeating her predecessor's comments—that the unit would be wound up after it had met its target in April 2002. [Interruption.] That was what her predecessor said. If the Minister wants to intervene, she is welcome to do so. Such comments presuppose that that target will be met, unless it has been altered. Can the Minister explain how that target will work? She said that the number of rough sleepers fell by one third between 1998 and 2000. Does that mean that the Government acknowledge that there is a rump of rough sleepers for whom alternatives to rough sleeping will never be taken up? Is there ultimately a zero target for rough sleepers or is it a matter of reducing their number to a rump level? 
 I am slightly confused about whether the Minister thinks that local authorities could carry out the job undertaken by the rough sleepers unit. We would contest that, although it was the responsibility of local authorities in the first place. They had a good deal of success with the rough sleepers initiative in the first part of the 1990s.

Sally Keeble: Will the hon. Gentleman give me a chance to respond to those points? People must accept that the population of rough sleepers tends to be transient. The clear aim is to prevent people from ending up on the streets in the first place. To ensure that people are moved off the streets to somewhere more suitable as quickly as possible will be a permanent aspect of the work carried out in respect of homelessness. The consultation paper on how to continue the work sets out the current state of play, which includes considering the role of local authorities. Let us consider some of the work of the rough sleepers unit. It has, for example, identified the possibility of people who leave the armed services ending up on the streets. That could not have not have been done without the central strategic unit that operates nationally and throughout Departments.

Tim Loughton: That was a speech masquerading as an intervention, but I take the hon. Lady's point. Of course, the rough sleeper population will not be the same all the time for a host of reasons, most tragically because those who tend to be rough sleepers are most vulnerable to health or drug problems. About 75 per cent. of rough sleepers in Soho are consumers of crack cocaine and contribute to the drug problem there. The mortality rate of those rough sleepers will be higher than that of people who are not involved in such practices. I am not saying that we would be dealing with the same core client list, but I am trying to get a measure of exactly what the Minister thinks is achievable, by which the success, or not, of the rough sleepers unit will be judged, and of whether the Government can formulate what, if anything, will succeed the unit. I do not concur with her opinion of the success of the rough sleepers unit given the money that has been put into it.
 Previously, we mentioned comments made by the head of Crisis, who gave the unit 10 out of 10 for intervention, but five out of 10 for prevention, and other people with long-standing expertise of dealing with rough sleepers. One such person is Cheryl St. Clair—I said that she was on the Christmas card list of the right hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe) but is not politically affiliated to us—who said that the biggest problem with the rough sleepers unit is: 
``it is political. It is driven by political requirements rather than moral requirements.'' 
She also said that the unit has become obsessed by process and has lost sight of outcomes for homeless people. 
 On that basis, it is difficult to judge whether the rough sleepers unit has been a success at a time when many local authorities, not least Westminster, have been taking many initiatives of their own to deal with rough sleepers. More initiatives have been taken than for some time, which have been independent from, and in collaboration with, the rough sleepers unit. 
 I do not think that the Minister has justified the value for money effort of the rough sleepers unit. A lot of money is involved, and some highly paid professionals run it. We question not their integrity, but the value for money that they offer. The Minister has not made the case for the output that the unit has achieved. Therefore, six months on from when we received a similar answer from her predecessor, it is incumbent on her to tell us exactly what the Government expect the rough sleepers unit to have achieved by April 2002, and what will happen to the unit, or its successor or none, after that date. We have not received any details on that from the Minister, and on that basis, my hon. Friend the Member for South-West Bedfordshire made his case well for why we should continue to be sceptical about the merits and value for money offered by the rough sleepers unit.

Sally Keeble: I have already described the target set out for the rough sleepers unit and I am loth to repeat it for the sake of it, although I will. We set the specific objective of reducing the number of people sleeping rough in England to as near zero as possible, or by at least two thirds by April 2002. The unit is a substantial way down that road. Figures published in August—they are a bit out of date—showed that in June 2000 an estimated 1,180 people were sleeping rough in England, which was a 30 per cent. decrease. That is extremely good, in terms of the targets set.
 The unit has also achieved permanent changes of thinking about rough sleeping and developed preventive strategies with central Government agencies. There is, and has been, a degree of sniping by the Conservative party about the rough sleepers unit, which is regrettable given the unit's track record. It has got results by taking a different approach that has stepped on the toes of some of the established charities that deal with homeless people—we saw that all over the papers when the unit was first set up—and it has thought innovatively about the causes of rough sleeping. It has identified vulnerable groups and worked with Government Departments to put preventive strategies in place. On that basis, it is correct to consult about how to take the process forward. It would be much better to have a consultation to consider the options and make a decision that will produce the best possible result for people who sleep rough, and in the process take into account the proper role that local authorities can and should play. I hope that on that basis and in recognising the genuine progress that has been made in dealing with the difficult human problem of rough sleeping, the hon. Member for South-West Bedfordshire will withdraw the amendment.

Andrew Selous: We are disappointed that rough sleeping is not specified in clause 3. However, as the arguments have been thoroughly explored twice, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Win Griffiths: Does the hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney) wish to move amendment No. 15?

David Kidney: You will not know, Mr. Griffiths, that this morning I received many plaudits, but they were all from Opposition Members.

Win Griffiths: Yes or no.

David Kidney: No.

Tim Loughton: On a point of order, Mr. Griffiths. If the hon. Gentleman is not prepared to move his amendment, can we do so?

Win Griffiths: Yes.
 Amendment proposed, No. 15, in page 3, line 12, at end insert— 
 `(5A) In formulating a homelessness strategy the authority shall make specific reference to— 
 (a) the extent and nature of empty housing and vacant property within their district across all sectors and tenures; 
 (b) targets for the re-use of such properties for residential purposes; and 
 (c) a strategy for action to achieve the targets set out in paragraph (b) above, including action by any public authority, voluntary organisation or other body or person whose activities are capable of contributing to the achieving of these objectives.'.—[Mr. Loughton.]
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 8.

Question accordingly negatived.

Nigel Waterson: I beg to move amendment No. 5, in page 3, line 18, after `organisations', insert
`, people living within the authority's area, including those who are homeless or at risk of homelessness'.
 After that excitement, we return to the mundane business of amendment No. 5. The amendment is simple, and I shall be brief. It reflects an amendment that we tabled in the Committee considering the Homes Bill. It would insert into the clause that deals with the homelessness strategy and how it is produced a provision that, in addition to public and local authorities and voluntary organisations, people who live in the authority's area, including those who are homeless or at risk of homelessness, should also be consulted. No matter how expert many people are, those who have been or are homeless and those who are worried about becoming homeless may be the most expert in some respects. That is obvious. We do not understand why the Government did not accept the amendment last time, but we hope that they will be more charitable this time.

Don Foster: I am delighted to serve under your chairmanship, Mr. Griffiths, and I assure you that I tend to be brief where possible. I shall demonstrate the truth of that claim by saying that I agree with every word uttered by the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Waterson), just as he agreed with me when we debated amendment No. 79 to the Homes Bill.

Alan Whitehead: I, too, am pleased to serve under your chairmanship, Mr. Griffiths. It is rather fortunate that we are dealing with a relatively straightforward matter, because I fear that the attention of some Opposition Members may have wandered to things that are occurring down the Corridor. I trust that as soon as they have any information on that, they will share it with their fellow Members.
 Unfortunately, I cannot be any more charitable than my predecessor was when the corresponding amendment was debated in Committee on the Homes Bill before the general election, because the situation remains the same. The amendment's objective is laudable, but unnecessary. The Government have consistently put people at the centre of our policies. We expect local authorities to seek the views of tenants and residents, including those who are homeless or at risk of homelessness, to inform homelessness reviews and help in drawing up strategies. Engaging people in the area, working in partnership and on a customer-focused basis are our expectations of local government. 
 As we heard in previous debates, it is not necessary to place every detail in the Bill. Indeed, hon. Members will agree that that is not always desirable. On occasion, too much detail distracts attention from what is critical and central. The code of guidance is the place to deal with that level of elaboration, and I have already outlined the intention of the revised code of guidance. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Nigel Waterson: Who am I to argue? I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5 - Provision of accommodation for persons not in priority need who are not homeless intentionally

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Nigel Waterson: I am slightly in your hands, Mr. Griffiths. Although we have no amendments to debate, a modest stand part debate will be helpful. I am happy to open that debate, but it might make more sense if the Minister speaks first, so that I can respond to what she has to tell us about the wonders of clause 5. Would she be willing to consider doing that?

Sally Keeble: I am happy to do that.
 The main provisions of the Bill are designed to strengthen the safety net for people who become homeless through no fault of their own and who have a priority need for accommodation. That is right, as many of those people are among the most vulnerable individuals in our society. 
 However, less vulnerable households also find themselves homeless, or are threatened with homelessness, through no fault of their own, such as single people and couples who do not have dependent children and, therefore, do not fall within the priority need categories. The duty owed to such people by a local housing authority is limited to the provision of advice and assistance to help them to secure accommodation. Provisions elsewhere in the Bill will strengthen that duty, but I shall not deal with them now. Clause 5 will give authorities more flexibility to provide assistance for homeless applicants who do not fall within the priority need categories: they will be able to use their discretion, so far as their resources allow. 
 Clause 5(1) will give local housing authorities a new power to secure accommodation for applicants who have become homeless unintentionally, but who do not fall within a priority need group. It will enable authorities to provide their own accommodation, to secure accommodation from another landlord, or to provide advice and assistance to ensure that accommodation becomes available. In fact, they can pursue any of the options that they can use to discharge a duty to secure accommodation for priority need applicants. We intend that it should be an especially effective provision in areas of low or mixed demand for housing. 
 Clause 5(2) provides a further power for local housing authorities to take reasonable steps to prevent households that do not fall within priority need categories from becoming homeless when they are faced with the prospect of homelessness within 28 days through no fault of their own. It will enable authorities to take steps to prevent homelessness for applicants who do not fall within priority need categories similar to those that they can take to discharge a duty towards applicants who are in priority need, and who face the threat of homelessness through no fault of their own. 
 The provisions in clause 5 will allow local authorities to be more flexible in their approach to helping applicants who do not fall within priority need categories and who are homeless, or are threatened with homelessness through no fault of their own. The extent to which individual authorities use those powers will be at their discretion—there will be no additional burden. However, through guidance, we shall encourage authorities—particularly those with the scope and resources to do so—to put those new powers to maximum use to assist homeless people who do not fall within priority need categories. 
 In the regulations that are intended to follow the Bill, the definition of people in priority need will be broadened.

Nigel Waterson: I am grateful to the Minister for that contribution, and I hope that she does not feel that I took her by surprise. It is an important provision and, although we are discussing the legislation for the second time, it would be wrong not to debate it.
 Organisations such as the Local Government Association are broadly supportive of the measure, because it gives local authorities more discretion and allows them to take a more strategic approach, by looking at the matter from the point of view of prevention rather than cure. Clause 5 would amend section 192 of the Housing Act 1996. At present, the duty towards people who do not fall within a priority need category is only to provide appropriate advice and assistance to them in their attempts to secure accommodation. The new measure will give local authorities a wider power to prevent such people from becoming homeless in the first place. 
 I do not wish to re-run an earlier debate, but I remind the Committee that this is a minor victory for the Opposition. The hon. Member for Regent's Park and Kensington, North (Ms Buck) tabled an amendment about the advice that is available to people in that category and the requirement that should be laid on local authorities in that context. She did not demonstrate the courage of her convictions—unlike the hon. Member for Stafford a moment ago—because she did not support her amendment when we pressed it to a vote. However, a signal victory was achieved, because the then Minister for Local Government, the right hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Mr. Raynsford) was prepared to make concessions on the issue—partly, I am sure, because of the support that we were prepared to give to the hon. Lady's amendment. 
 In the Committee, the Minister referred to 
``the variable, inconsistent and sometimes inadequate quality of local authority advice and assistance.''—[Official Report, Standing Committee D, 30 January 2001; c. 343.] 
He went on to say that he saw merit in strengthening the duty on local authorities. The amendment was lost, but the Government introduced their own amendments to schedule 2 of what was then the Homes Bill, and they have now reappeared as paragraphs 8 to 11 of schedule 1 of this Bill. Although there are no amendments to clause 5—perhaps that is an indication of the breadth of support for what it is trying to achieve—it is important to mark it to remind anyone who has forgotten that that improvement was a victory for the Opposition. That is worth noting.

Sally Keeble: I welcome the Opposition's support. It seems to me that the victory belongs not so much to the Opposition as to my hon. Friend the Member for Regent's Park and Kensington, North, who raised the issue. She is one of several Government Members who have a huge amount of experience and expertise in the area of housing and who have contributed in many ways to the Bill—along with the hon. Member for Bath (Mr. Foster), of course.
 The Bill will provide help to people who, although not in priority need, none the less face the prospect of eviction and homelessness. As such, it is an important measure, and I am extremely pleased that the hon. Member for Eastbourne supports it, as does the rest of the Committee. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7 - Events which cause the duty to cease

Nigel Waterson: I beg to move amendment No. 8, in page 4, line 40, at end insert—
 `and states that the offer shall remain open for acceptance for not less than four working days from the date of the offer, or such longer period as the authority considers reasonable in all the circumstances.'.

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 12, in page 4, line 40, at end insert—
 `and states that the offer shall remain available for such period as the authority may determine is reasonable in all the circumstances.'.

Nigel Waterson: We return to this issue, having dealt with it to some extent in the Committee stage of the previous Bill. In case he springs to his feet to try to claim it for himself, let me say immediately that the provenance for the amendment was an amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Bath. [Interruption.] If his relationship with the Minister gets any broader or deeper, we could be talking about the Privy Council—who knows?
 We thought that amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Bath, although it had its good points, was overly modest. The issue is how long applicants may take to make a decision on a firm offer of accommodation. We had some evidence, probably anecdotal, that some local authorities—no doubt those with enormous pressure of demand—require a decision within 24 hours. That struck all members of the Committee as being wrong. Clearly, if someone is minded to make a decision that quickly, that is another matter. However, 24 or 48 hours struck us as too short a period. If the hon. Member for Bath does not mind me stealing his thunder, he referred to the London borough of Southwark, which generously set the decision time on a definite offer up to 48 hours.

Don Foster: I rise merely to avoid misleading the Committee. If the hon. Gentleman reads the record, he will see what I said. My understanding is that Southwark's standard practice is to work to 24 hours, but that it will allow a further 48 hours if an applicant requires it. In such cases, the time is brought up to the three-day limit that was in my original amendment. He is right to say that there are other examples of authorities in London and elsewhere where 24 hours is the normal practice.

Nigel Waterson: I am grateful for that clarification. This is a matter in which practice varies widely. At the time, I think that all Committee members felt that applicants should have time to deliberate and talk to their families and advisers—legal advisers even—before making a decision that will affect their lives for a long time. People should not feel pressured into making such decisions in a short space of time. Indeed, the then Minister said:
 ``In the overwhelming majority of cases, three days is too short a period in which to expect a person to decide on a final offer.''—[Official Report, Standing Committee D, 30 January 2001; c. 356.] 
Three days was the period proposed in the Liberal Democrat amendment then before the Committee. 
 That leads us to the question of allocations, but I shall only touch on the subject because we shall have a much broader debate on it toward the end of the Committee stage. Things have moved on since our previous discussions, because at that time 90-odd authorities had applied for the pilot scheme of choice-based allocation. I am pleased to say that my borough of Eastbourne—as well as Bath, I think—was among those successful in bidding to pilot the Delft or choice-based scheme. We shall see how that works out with the pressures that I have described on available housing stock in places such as Eastbourne. The new development may have a significant effect on the problem. 
 My amendment is narrow. We have debated it before, and it seemed to be common ground, even with the previous Minister. I hope that this Minister will take the same view that, in the great majority of cases, three days is too short a time in which to expect people to make such a decision. I have plumped for four days. This is a probing amendment and the Minister will be pleased to hear that I shall not press it to a Division. However, the Government should re-examine whether some minimum period should be included so that, allowing for flexibility and those who want to make quick decisions, the people involved, who are often in a vulnerable position, do not feel unduly pressured into making a hurried choice.

Don Foster: I am grateful for the generosity of the hon. Member for Eastbourne in acknowledging that the provenance of the amendment came from one that I moved in earlier discussions of part II of the Homes Bill. He eloquently and, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, succinctly outlined the arguments as to why it is important that we ensure that homeless people are given reasonable time in which to make a decision about whether to accept a final offer of accommodation.
 As the hon. Member for Eastbourne rightly said, the Government's intention is to ensure that homeless people are given greater choice about their future housing. Nevertheless, it is well known that homeless people are not given much choice at the moment. For example, local authorities will often give families or individuals who want to transfer several options from which to choose and yet, sadly, a homeless person or family will be given only one choice, not a range of options. The Government are keen to change that and I support their intention. Similarly, a household seeking to transfer will often have its preferences of area taken into account, whereas a homeless household or individual will not. A third issue is the type of housing. Households wishing to transfer often have a much greater say in the type of accommodation to which they move than homeless individuals or households, which are rarely given such a choice. 
 I hope that Committee members agree that the range of choice offered to homeless households or individuals is far narrower than for other categories of people. We seek to change that. All hon. Members would surely accept that the practice still adopted by several local authorities of giving a homeless household or individual a limited period in which to decide whether to accept a final offer is unacceptable and unreasonable. As the hon. Member for Eastbourne said, in an earlier amendment I proposed a minimum period of three days. The hon. Gentleman now proposes a minimum period of four days. That is a welcome amendment and, were there any likelihood of it succeeding, I would be happy to support it. 
 I am conscious of the way in which our deliberations and the decision-making process works. During our previous deliberations, the then Under-Secretary of State for the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (Mr. Ainsworth) made it clear that he was sympathetic to the concerns that I expressed then and which the hon. Member for Eastbourne has expressed today. The Minister said: 
 ``I appreciate the intention behind this amendment, which is to ensure that, under Part IV, applicants have a reasonable period in which to consider a final offer from a local housing authority. Applicants need time for deliberation, and possibly to consult relatives, friends or advisers on the options available.'' 
He went on: 
 ``The hon. Member for Bath (Mr. Foster) has made some good points in relation to the time it can take to explore educational opportunities in an area and to secure undertakings on repairs.'' —[Official Report, Standing Committee D, 30 January 2001; c.355.] 
I had several concerns about giving people only a short period in which to decide. I argued at that time and reiterate now that, in considering a final offer, a homeless person will want an opportunity to consult friends and relatives.

Brian Iddon: I put it to the hon. Gentleman that the amendment is worse than the one that he moved in our previous debate on the Homes Bill, because it would allow many local authorities to stick to 24 hours.

Don Foster: I am grateful for that intervention, but if the hon. Gentleman will bide his time for a moment, I shall come to that point.
 In coming to a final decision, people must consider a number of issues: the opinion of friends and relatives; the suitability of schooling for any children involved; the impact of the decision on work that the individual might take up; and whether the local authority would give an assurance that any necessary repairs would be carried out. Many local authorities will not carry out repairs until an allocation has been made. 
 The hon. Gentleman obviously agrees that a 24-hour period would be unreasonable. I was delighted that the then Minister entirely agreed with that view and he went on to say that, in some cases, three days might be an unreasonable period, which is one reason why he was unhappy with my particular amendment.

Nigel Waterson: I hesitate to interrupt and I have now given the wording to Hansard, but the Minister accepted that in the overwhelming majority of cases, three days was too short a period. I do not want the hon. Gentleman to undersell the case.

Don Foster: The hon. Gentleman is correct, as the Minister stated:
 ``I have already said that in the overwhelming majority of cases, three days is unreasonable.''—[Official Report, Standing Committee D, 30 January 2001; c. 357.] 
I entirely agree with that. 
 In common with other Committee members, I accept that 24 hours is unreasonable and that three days is unreasonable in many cases. We have to decide whether we are likely to persuade the Minister to accept an amendment to four days. My amendment may not be the best way forward, but it offers another way out for the Government. It would allow the period to be ``reasonable''. I chose that word for several reasons: first, because the Minister himself said that there must be a reasonable period of time; secondly, because the word could be challenged in law--[Interruption.] 
 The hon. Member for Bolton, South-East (Dr. Iddon) suggests from a sedentary position that that is not a sensible way forward. If he believes that, he has many further opportunities to table amendments to the Bill, which changes elements of the Housing Act 1996. I did a quick trawl through one part of the Act and noted that it made use of the word ``reasonable'' in legally challengeable ways in sections 175(3), 176(b), 177(2), 192(1)(a) and 195(2). I have no doubt that it is also used in many other parts of the Act. 
 My preference is for the amendment of the hon. Member for Eastbourne, because it would insert a firm minimum period into the Bill, but I am offering the Government another way out—by inserting a provision that would enable legal challenges—if they will not accept the hon. Gentleman's amendment. I hope that it is clear that it would be preferable to insert a specific minimum time period into the Bill, but that I am providing a backstop in the event that the hon. Gentleman and other Opposition Members cannot persuade the Government to accept his amendment.

Sally Keeble: To place the clause in context, members of the Committee will recall that clause 6 will ensure that the main homelessness duty in section 193 of the 1996 Act continues to apply until brought to an end by one of several possible scenarios. Clause 7 amends those scenarios and provides some important safeguards for homeless applicants to ensure that the duties cannot be brought to an end unreasonably.
 Section 193 already provides for the duty to end where the applicant rejects an offer of suitable accommodation—that is, an offer of short-term accommodation rather than a settled home—intended as a discharge of the homelessness duty; where he accepts or rejects an offer of suitable accommodation, which is intended as a settled home, allocated under part VI of the 1996 Act; where he voluntarily leaves short-term accommodation provided as a discharge of the homelessness duty or makes himself intentionally homeless from that accommodation; or where the applicant ceases to be eligible for homelessness assistance—for example, an asylum seeker who receives a negative decision on his or her asylum claim. 
 I appreciate the intention of the amendments, which is to ensure that applicants under part VI have a reasonable period in which to consider a final offer from a local housing authority. That is clearly important. Applicants need time for deliberation and possibly to consult relatives, friends or advisers on the available options. Applicants need a reasonable time in which to make informed and sensible choices. 
 Amendment No. 8 mentions a minimum period of four days. That appears to be a compromise between the three days previously proposed by the hon. Member for Bath and the five days subsequently suggested by his hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) when these provisions were examined in their previous guise as part II of the Homes Bill. 
 A case could be made for any or, indeed, all of those periods, but I do not believe that they are necessary. Different circumstances will require different periods for consideration, which is why putting fixed numbers into the Bill would be unhelpful. On Second Reading, for example, I referred to a constituent who was in hospital having a baby when her mother came in waving the offer of accommodation. In such instances, a fixed period of three, four or even more days would be unreasonable. The personal circumstances facing an individual and the practical circumstances facing the authority must be taken into account. 
 We discussed previously the problem of empty properties. For several local authorities, consideration of the number of empty properties will weigh heavily on their minds as they decide what to do about making offers of accommodation and the length of time that applicants have to consider those offers. It makes no sense to specify a fixed period of time. I would argue, too, that there is an inherent danger that a statutory minimum would quickly come to be used as the maximum period to be allowed. 
 Amendment No. 12 would ensure that the authority provides applicants with a reasonable period in all circumstances to consider a final offer. I am not against the proposal in principle, but the amendment adds nothing to the requirements of general law. Local authorities must in all circumstances act reasonably in the undertaking of all their duties, and that extends to final offers. We must be careful not to burden the Bill with excessive detail obscuring the principal purposes of the legislation. 
 Hon. Members who raised that point have drawn attention to an important issue. I shall ensure that the relevant considerations of reasonableness are covered in the code of guidance. That will take on board the points made by the hon. Member for Bath. 
 We are all concerned about the experience of homeless people who are made offers of accommodation and expected to make a quick response, when they might have to live in accommodation that they would not choose for themselves. The shift towards choice-based lettings, which is part of the Government's wider agenda on housing, will be extremely important, along with this legislation, in dealing with many of the worries expressed by hon. Members this afternoon. I ask, therefore, that the amendment be withdrawn.

Nigel Waterson: I hear what the Minister is saying, but I would like to make a few points.
 Everyone seems to agree that a fixed period of one, two or even three days is unreasonable. The Minister objects to the amendment on the basis that a minimum can become a maximum, but a minimum is exactly what it says—a minimum. It is also a bit much to balance the period of time in which people must make their decisions against the fact that there are a lot of empty council properties. I do not think that that situation can be blamed on people who fail to make quick decisions and, on reflection, I do not think that the point was germane to the issue. 
 The Minister said that the matter would be dealt with in the guidance, so I suppose that we must be content with that, but we could happily have dealt with it more briskly—today or in the previous debate—and put a lot of people's minds at rest.

Don Foster: I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman knows whether guidance has the same force in law as legislation and whether it would be possible to challenge a local authority that continues to operate a 24-hour policy on the basis of guidance.
 This is a longer intervention than it might have been because I am conscious that some hon. Members are receiving interesting pager messages. I hope that in his response to this intervention, the hon. Member for Eastbourne will tell us the result of the ballot that has taken place.

Nigel Waterson: Just to add to the tension, I shall deal with the hon. Gentleman's question about guidance first.—[Interruption.] Ah, it looks as if the result is being circulated anyway. It may be worth recording that the result has made me smile.
 There is a difference between guidance and legislation. We are not, after all, referring to the sort of people who would take the council to a judicial review about whether it is reasonable to give them X number of days in which to make a decision.

Sally Keeble: In the exercise of their functions, local authorities must take note of the guidance, so guidance has force in the courts.

Nigel Waterson: I am sure that that is right, but people have to get into the courts first and have the means and desire to do so when they may have more immediate worries on their minds. That is the key distinction here. It is unfortunate that the Government are not prepared to put even a minimum period into the Bill. Having said that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8 - Review of decisions as to suitability of accommodation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Andrew Selous: I welcome the clause for its strengthening of applicants' rights to challenge the suitability of accommodation. I especially welcome the fact that it makes the system suit the individual rather than the other way round, as so often with our legislation. However, I wonder what difference it will make in practice to many of our constituents. Shelter expressed the concern about clause 5 that the powers may be somewhat theoretical in nature; I suspect that that could be said of this clause as well.
 I want to illustrate my point by means of an individual case. On Saturday morning, a young couple came to see me who described themselves as homeless. 
 They had two children—a two-and-a-half year old and a nine-and-a-half year old. Yesterday they were offered a property and had only 24 hours to decide whether to take it. In their view it was unsuitable for them for several reasons. It was underneath a stairwell in which people congregated at night, and they thought that there would be a lot of noise when the children were going to sleep and that there might be drug taking. The wife thought that, when she came back with shopping, by the time she had taken her children to the top of the stairs and into the flat her shopping might well have been stolen. The property was a first-floor flat with a balcony, and she was worried that her two-and-a-half year old was likely to be able to clamber over the balcony and that she would not always be able to supervise the child. No doubt under the Bill they could request a review of the suitability of the accommodation and would, I hope, be told that it was not suitable for a family in their circumstances. However, in a local authority such as the one in my area, it is unlikely that further offers of accommodation would be made. How will the clause help such a family?

Sally Keeble: Cases such as that to which the hon. Member for South-West Bedfordshire refers are familiar to several members of the Committee. The clause was introduced to deal with anxieties expressed by Shelter, which welcomed it. This important provision has been included in the Bill in response to a recent judgment in the Court of Appeal in the case of Alghile v. City of Westminster. That judgment provided a new interpretation of the provisions of the 1996 Act that deal with an applicant's right to ask for a review of the suitability of accommodation offered.
 The provisions of the 1996 Act are wanting. They give applicants the right to ask for a review of suitability but do not require that authorities notify them of that right, as they are required to do for all the other aspects for which an applicant can ask for a review. 
 The 1996 Act also provides that the section 193 duty to secure accommodation comes to an end if the applicant refuses an offer of accommodation that the authority considers suitable. However, the Act does not make it clear that the applicant must have the opportunity to ask for a review of suitability and that a review must be carried out before the refusal of an offer can bring the duty to an end. 
 The effect of the current provisions is a deep lack of clarity. A 1997 High Court decision in the case of Byfield allowed applicants to accept an offer, thus avoiding bringing the duty to an end, and to ask for a review of suitability. That interpretation was overturned in March of this year, when the Court of Appeal ruled that applicants could not both accept an offer and ask for a review of suitability. Currently, therefore, if applicants want to ask for a review of suitability, they must refuse and take a gamble. If they lose and the authority upholds its initial decision that the property offered is suitable, the duty to secure accommodation ends and they will become homeless. 
 We do not believe that that is right, so we are taking the opportunity to clarify the law and put the matter on a statutory footing. The clause provides that applicants must be informed that they have the right to ask for a review of the suitability of accommodation offered before a refusal of that offer can bring the homelessness duty to an end. The clause also makes it clear that applicants may request such a review regardless of whether they have accepted an offer. Therefore, they can accept the offer and have a review of the suitability of the accommodation. 
 The clause will restore an important part of the homelessness safety net. It will ensure that applicants can ask for a review of the suitability of accommodation offered to them without taking the risk that the homelessness duty owed to them will be brought to an end if the local authority upholds its initial decision. Crucially, the clause will come into force as soon as the Bill receives royal assent. I hope that this important clause will stand part of the Bill.

Tim Loughton: I wish to probe the Minister about the clause a little further. We are broadly in favour of the amendments that the Minister is proposing to make to the Bill. Anything that increases the choice and suitability of accommodation offered to tenants must be right, although the bottom line is that a choice-based system will amount to nothing unless choice is available. As the hon. Lady said—and as my hon. Friend the Member for South-West Bedfordshire recounted—there are horrendous cases of homelessness.
 During the past three weeks, three such examples have been brought to my attention at my surgery, one of which concerned a female constituent who had attempted suicide. She had been allocated a flat on her own on the fourth floor of a council block, from which she had thrown herself within 24 hours. Fortunately, she was not killed, but she was badly injured. Such accommodation was obviously not suitable for someone who was receiving mental treatment. Several cases have been brought to my attention involving housing blocks that were riddled with damp. One concerned a family with children who have serious asthma problems and who had been moved into a damp flat. Subsequently, one of the children had visited hospital three times with asthma-related problems that were exacerbated by the dampness. 
 Another more familiar problem concerns the suitability of bed-and-breakfast accommodation, which in many cases is all that is on offer. One constituency case involved a mother who suffered from a complicated medical condition. Her husband was desperately looking for work, but the only work that he had been offered involved night security. The family were unable to be in the bed-and-breakfast accommodation during the day—the terms of most bed-and-breakfast accommodation—as a result of which the husband was unable to sleep. The wife's medical condition made it highly undesirable for her to share bathroom facilities with other families. The family had been offered bed-and-breakfast accommodation some miles away from the school that the children attended and they had already been through a disruptive cycle because they had moved from their base. All such cases highlight the unsuitability of accommodation that may be offered. 
 How will the review system work? Realistically, on requesting a review, can the Minister maintain that the case will not be prejudiced under the new system? I am referring to ``heavy-handed'' treatment from a housing officer who may suggest that, if a person applies for a review, it will prejudice their chances of receiving a decent property within the terms of the discretion available to various housing officers. I am not saying that that would be a deliberate ploy, but given the desperate circumstances of many housing departments with a lack of available accommodation, it may come into it. Who will carry out such a review and how sure can a tenant be that it has been carried out properly, independently and objectively? If the review is upheld, what is the next stage? How will alternative accommodation be offered? That may turn out to be equally unsuitable. Where will the process end? 
 While welcoming the strengthening of tenants' rights that the clause is supposed to represent, we should like further information about how it will lead to the improvements to which the Minister referred?

Sally Keeble: On the different cases to which the hon. Gentleman referred, I would not make a decision about whether the accommodation provided by the local authority was suitable. Clearly, it is up to the review to decide such matters, not someone who does not have all the facts to hand. The clause will improve the position in two main areas for those who want to challenge the suitability of the accommodation that they have been offered. They must be told about the right of review, which did not happen before. People cannot be offered accommodation and then left to work out for themselves at some stage further down the line that they could have requested a review of its suitability. The council will conduct the review.
 It is particularly important that a person's acceptance of an offer should not prejudice their right to a review of the accommodation's suitability. The hon. Gentleman talked about a heavy-handed housing officer pressuring someone into accepting an offer and then telling them that they cannot question its suitability. The point is that people can accept an offer and then, if need be, have a review of the accommodation's suitability. That represents an important improvement to the rights of people moving from homelessness to permanent accommodation. I hope that hon. Members will therefore support the clause.

Tim Loughton: My point is not that the housing officer will not have to change his ways, because officially what the Minister says is right. However, we know that a housing officer has the leeway and discretion to say, ``Well, if you don't go along with this, you're entitled to a review, but it won't help your case.''
 In addition, the Minister says that the council will conduct the review, but could the review panel include the housing officer who made the offer in the first place? Where is the independence and objectivity of the review process?

Sally Keeble: A local authority will have to conduct internal reviews in accordance with the Human Rights Act 1998. It gives effect to the European convention on human rights, which includes the right to a fair hearing, so there are external constraints. I agree that quite a number of tenants or prospective tenants will not be looking to make such a challenge, but we are talking about setting up a procedure that protects tenants' rights and ensures that, in all reasonable circumstances, they can challenge the suitability of their offer. We are also discussing access to information about their rights. That constitutes a substantial improvement to the current situation.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10 - Persons claiming to be homeless who are at risk of violence

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Tim Loughton: My observations relate more to what is not in the clause than to what is there. In Committee on the Homes Bill, we discussed at length the problem of domestic violence leading to homelessness. Opposition Members fully support any strengthening of the legislation and the availability of alternative accommodation for people who are homeless through no fault of their own, but because of violence or the threat of it that does not necessarily constitute making them unintentionally homeless. That includes the threat of violence from neighbours, which may escalate into rather nasty cases of violence. We have all probably dealt with cases of intimidation that lead to violence from antisocial neighbours.
 When we discussed the matter previously, the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Ms King), who was a member of the previous Committee, proposed new clause 15, which dealt specifically with racial violence. At the time, we said that she presented her case effectively and forcefully, and we were supportive of it. I responded to the points that she made about her new clause, although she saw fit to withdraw it because the Minister was sympathetic and promised to consider the situation with a view to ensuring that her points were included in the thrust of the regulations, even if they were not in the Bill. However, I cannot see any reference to homelessness caused by racial violence or threats of racial violence in this Bill or in the explanatory notes. Yet, as we have seen in the events of recent weeks, that menace has not gone away and may be more topical now than when we discussed it in January, although the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow gave harrowing examples of racial abuse against her own constituents. 
 We all know the problems of the hon. Lady's east London constituency, in which residents had missiles thrown at them and burning rubbish and petrol bombs pushed through their letter boxes. I remember her mentioning long-term hate campaigns that may not result in actual violence but that are intimidation of such a high order that people live in fear for their lives, which constitutes racial abuse. 
 I have encountered cases in my constituency in which people who live in their own home—they are private-owner occupiers—or who live in council or another sort of landlord accommodation leave their home because of abuse that they are getting at that address and not because there is something wrong with the home. Those people will sleep on sofas and floors with friends or relatives but, to all intents and purposes, they are in need of alternative accommodation. The hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow gave the example of people who had their own home but who could not afford to pay the mortgage on that and rent another residence. They wanted to do that because they were scared stiff to live in their own home. 
 Such people are not only tenants, but owner-occupiers, and are virtually unprotected by current law. We must improve their access to the homelessness safety net. I hoped that the hon. Lady's comments would lead to a beefing up of the Bill, or at least the accompanying notes, or the promise of problem being addressed in the code because otherwise people will fall through the safety net. 
 The hon. Lady rightly said that under half of local housing authorities have provisions for such racial abuse and violence that affects peoples' homeless status. A similar figure was heard with regard to other conditions this morning. 
 I think that it is correct to raise this matter when discussing clause 10. We concur with the new provisions that deal with violence, intimidation and particularly women fleeing home from domestic violence, but will the Minister address the issues that I raised about the apparent absence of a beefing-up of help for those who are the subject of racial rather than domestic or ordinary violence?

Don Foster: Before the Minister responds, the Committee should be grateful to the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) for raising that particular point. During our debate on Second Reading, I referred to the knowledge that all Committee members would have that the Government are consulting on their intentions to extend the homeless priority categories. That would be a welcome extension. The Minister gave me an undertaking that she would make available in the Library copies of that consultation document. I am grateful that she has not only done that, but has sent me a copy of the document.
 I note with considerable interest that many concerns raised by the hon. Gentleman are covered in the consultation document and that specific reference is made to cases of racial harassment. My question is technical, because I am slightly confused. Why is the wording in clause 10 so detailed when the issue is still undergoing consultation, in respect not only of people who are at risk of violence but of various other categories? Is it appropriate to have such detail for one category when others are still being consulted on, and when will we have an opportunity to debate some of the details raised by the hon. Gentleman?

Sally Keeble: I welcome the intervention from the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham because it provides an opportunity to place on record some details of the provision and the arguments around it.
 The Housing Act 1996 includes provisions that ensure that people who are at risk of domestic violence if they remain in their current home must be treated as homeless on the grounds that it is not be reasonable for them to continue living where they are. Housing authorities are also prevented from referring a homeless case to another local authority if the applicant or any member of his or her family would be at risk of domestic violence in the district of that other local authority. The provisions provide important safeguards for people who have experienced domestic violence or who are at risk of it. Regrettably, the number of people who face such distress is by no means insignificant. Labour Members in particular have substantial experience of working with such people. 
 However, violence can be motivated by other things and may come from different quarters; the perpetrators are not always members or ex-members of the family. Racially motivated violence in particular can be a depressingly familiar fact of life for far too many people, and the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham referred to some discussions about that. No one should have to live under the shadow of violence, whatever its motivation. There is no rationale for distinguishing between a risk of domestic violence and any other form of violence. 
 Clause 10 will extend the protection currently provided for homeless applicants at risk of domestic violence to applicants at risk of any violence. Clause 10(1) will amend section 177 of the 1996 Act to provide that it would not be reasonable for an applicant to continue living in accommodation if there were a probability that that would lead to any form of violence against the applicant, a member of his or her family or anyone else who might be expected to live with the applicant. That includes racial violence. 
 Clause 10(2) will amend the conditions of referral as set out in section 198 of the 1996 Act. They provide the criteria that determine whether one housing authority can refer a homeless case to another. Currently, the conditions are not met if applicants or anyone who might reasonably be expected to live with them are at risk of domestic violence in the district of the other authority. Clause 10(2) will extend that safeguard and provide that the conditions for referral of a homelessness case are not met if applicants, or anyone who might reasonably be expected to live with them, have suffered violence in the district of the other authority and there would be a probability of further, similar violence if the victim returned to that district. 
 The hon. Member for Bath asked about consultation on the provisions. This Committee and the other processes in the House offer the opportunity to explore the Bill's wording. We will, of course, consult widely on the code of guidance. The explanation given this afternoon provides more detail about the way in which the clause will operate and gives me some reassurance that it extends to racially motivated violence. The clause includes important protections for the victims of violence. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11 - Section 204(4): appeals

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Win Griffiths: With this, it will be convenient to take new clause 2—Section 202: reviews—
 `After section 202 of the 1996 Act (right to request review of decision) there is inserted—
 ``202A Section 202: reviews
 (1) This section applies where an applicant has the right to request a review of a decision by an authority or authorities under section 202.
 (2) If the applicant is dissatisfied with a decision by the authority—
(a) not to exercise their power to continue to secure that accommodation is available for the applicant's occupation pending a review under section 188;
(b) in a case where the authority have secured that accommodation is available for the applicant's occupation under section 190(2)(a), to cease to secure that accommodation is so available before the time available to the applicant to bring an appeal under section 204 has expired (or, if sooner, the day on which an appeal is brought by the applicant);
(c) not to exercise their power to secure that accommodation is available for the applicant's occupation pending a review, under section 200(5); or
(d) to exercise their power under either section 188 or section 200(5) for a limited time ending before the time available to the applicant to bring an appeal under section 204 has expired (or, if sooner, the day on which an appeal is brought by the applicant), or, in either case, to cease exercising their power before that time,
he may appeal to the county court against the decision.
 (3) An appeal under this section may not be brought after the time available to the applicant to bring an appeal under section 204 has expired (or, if sooner, after the date on which an appeal is brought).
 (4) On an appeal under this section the court—
(a) may order the authority to secure that accommodation is available for the applicant's occupation until the time available to the applicant to bring an appeal under section 204 has expired (or such earlier time as the court may specify); and
(b) shall confirm or quash the decision appealed against,
and in considering whether to confirm or quash the decision the court shall apply the principles applied by the High Court on an application for judicial review.
 (5) If the court quashes the decision it may order the authority to exercise any of the powers mentioned in subsection (2) above in the applicant's case for such period as may be specified in the order.
 (6) An order under subsection (5)—
(a) may only be made if the court is satisfied that failure to exercise the power in accordance with the order would substantially prejudice the applicant's ability to pursue the review against the authority's decision in his case;
(b) may not specify any period ending after the time available to the applicant to bring an appeal under section 204 has expired.''.'.

Don Foster: Mr. Griffiths, you are new to our deliberations, so you will not be fully aware of the importance of postcards written to Mrs. Foster. However, for some members of the Committee—not least myself—they have become a significant feature of the passage of homelessness legislation. I am delighted that in clause 11 there is--already, before any deliberations have taken place—an opportunity for me to write another postcard to Mrs. Foster.
 During our deliberations on part II of the Homes Bill, I expressed concern about the availability of accommodation for people seeking to challenge a decision by a local housing authority. At that time, the Government were not minded to accept my amendments; however, I am absolutely delighted to see in the new Homelessness Bill the very wording that I had proposed as an amendment at an earlier stage of our deliberations. Unfortunately, the Government have not gone as far as I would have liked: they covered one part of the amendment but not the other. The purpose of the new clause is to seek to persuade the Government to even the situation out and ensure that both aspects of my concerns are covered. In doing that, I shall deploy the same arguments that were, clearly, very successful. 
 I apologise to the Committee for the complexity of the new clause. To ensure that it fully meets all the various aspects of the legislation, the new clause has become somewhat complex, although the issue is simple. Let me explain it in a simple way. 
 When a homeless person or household applies to a local authority, the local authority must make two decisions: first, whether the person is deemed to be unintentionally homeless—the eligibility issue; and secondly, the priority that is to be afforded to a person who has met the first part of the test—the priority issue. If a person is unhappy with the local housing authority's decision, he has two opportunities to challenge it. The first is during the review process, which is an internal review carried out by the local authority itself. We discussed that in an earlier debate. If the person is not satisfied with the outcome of the review, the second stage is the appeals process, in which there is an opportunity to ask the court to decide the matter. 
 In our earlier deliberations, I argued that, during the review process and the subsequent appeals process, a person seeking to challenge a local authority's decision would be disadvantaged if he or she did not have accommodation during that period. I proposed several amendments that would seek to ensure that, in cases that were likely to be won by the applicant, it would be reasonable for the local authority to provide accommodation. 
 With regard to the second stage—the appeals process—the Government were not initially prepared to accept my proposal. However, I am delighted that in clause 11(4)(a) the Government clearly state that they now accept that a county court should be able, if it thinks that it is an appropriate course of action, to instruct a local authority to make accommodation available to an applicant during the appeal period. 
 Strangely, however, the Government have not so far seen fit to accept that the same principle is valid with regard to the internal local authority review process. It is equally true that a person who is going through the review process would be disadvantaged if he or she did not have access to accommodation. The Government will argue that, in such circumstances, accommodation will probably be made available, because existing legislation gives the local authority the opportunity to do that. Indeed, the right of review is contained in section 202 of the 1996 Act, and section 188(3) gives local authorities the power to provide accommodation during the review period. 
 Sadly, it is the clear experience of many people who have gone through the process that local authorities do not make accommodation available, despite the fact that they have the power to do so. The Government have provided strong guidance to local authorities that they should make that accommodation available. The guidance says that authorities should 
``give careful consideration to the merits of each case'', 
 ``consider the personal circumstances of the applicant and the consequences for him or her of deciding not to exercise their discretion'' 
to provide accommodation. However, although the power exists, in far too many cases local authorities do not provide that accommodation. 
 I moved amendments to part II of the Homes Bill that sought to make it more likely that local authorities would provide accommodation in such circumstances. The Government responded—perhaps not unreasonably—by saying that, if accommodation was to be made so easily available, many people would seek a review, although it did not stand much of a chance of succeeding, in the knowledge that it would provide them with accommodation for a period of time at least. Thus vexatious requests for reviews would be made, merely to get accommodation. 
 Although the Government put forward a reasonable point, they had made a similar point with regard to an earlier attempt by me in respect of accommodation during the appeals process. On that occasion, they were prepared, in effect, to say that if one solution does not work, a different solution should be found. Therefore, with regard to the appeals process, it has now been accepted that the county court should be allowed to make a decision on such matters and, if it considers that it is appropriate, to instruct the local authority to make accommodation available. 
 Therefore, I make a simple appeal to the Committee. Having already accepted my arguments as a way of achieving that end without causing the problems that the Government foresaw initially in respect of the appeals process, I now appeal to the Government to accept exactly the same logic in respect of the review period. Failure to do so would mean that, in the early stage when more people are likely to have their claims tested, they will be put at a significant disadvantage if they do not have that access to accommodation in the event that they have a strong case—a strong case which, under my new clause, would be judged by the county court. 
 My proposal is clear. I am sure that the Government will want to redraft my complex new clause, but I hope that today I shall be able to write at least the first lines of a postcard to Mrs. Foster to tell her that we are getting somewhere. I look forward to the Minister saying that that is the case.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I should like to comment on the serious intention of the hon. Member for Bath, although his speech and his new clause are a long-winded way in which to amend section 202 of the Housing Act 1996. There is a more simple way of doing what has taken him a page and quarter of gobbledegook to do. If the word ``may'' in section 204(4) of the 1996 Act had been altered to ``must'', that would have eliminated the entire need for the hon. Gentleman's new clause. If the local authority had to provide accommodation during the period when an applicant was appealing against its review procedure, that would have had the same effect as the new clause. However, the hon. Gentleman is now about to tell me that I am wrong.

Don Foster: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving me the opportunity to tell him why he is wrong. If a local authority had to provide accommodation in all cases, undoubtedly a large number of people who did not have a leg to stand on would request an appeal for exactly the reason that I described earlier, which is at least to ensure that temporary accommodation was provided to them for the period of the review process. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman made a slip of the tongue when he referred to the appeals process, because we have already sorted that out—at least to my satisfaction. We are now dealing with the review process, not the appeals process.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: We are discussing an appeal against the provisions of the review process. If the hon. Member for Bath had read the further qualifications under section 204(4), he would know that paragraph (a) refers to
``during the period for appealing under this section'', 
while paragraph (b) states: 
``if an appeal is brought, until the appeal (and any further appeal) is finally determined.'' 
In other words, my suggestion of amending the word ``may'' to ``must'' would have applied only when an applicant appealed, which is surely the whole thrust of section 204 of the 1996 Act. It deals with a situation in which an applicant appeals against a decision by the local authority on review under sections 188, 189 and 200. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Bath is quibbling again. Perhaps he would like to tell me where I am wrong.

Don Foster: There are two stages, the first of which is a review process that is carried out internally; there is then an appeals process, which is an opportunity for a second bite at the cherry. We could, of course, use confusing terminology and say that an appeal is being made against the review, but that would involve us in the appeals process. In the first case, the person is saying that he is not happy with the decision that was made and is asking that the case be reviewed. It is that particular stage to which I refer.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I think that we are both arguing about the same thing: the powers to be used when, in an applicant's opinion, the local authority has failed to review the case properly. The applicant has the power to take the matter on a point of law to the county court on appeal. We are discussing the duty of the local authority and whether it should house that applicant during an appeal to the county court.
 That is what we are arguing about.

Don Foster: No.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: Well, that is what the Act says.

Don Foster: The hon. Gentleman constantly refers to the 1996 Act. I suggest that he looks at the clause that we are debating, clause 11, which already significantly amends section 204 of that Act. Section 188, a few pages earlier in the 1996 legislation, should also be amended.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I have already referred to sections 188, 189 and 200. The hon. Member for Bath is just trying to ensure that if the local authority fails to review properly in accordance with those sections and an applicant decides to appeal to the county court, the local authority will have the right to re-house.

Don Foster: No.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: Well, that is my understanding. If I am wrong, no doubt the Minister will tell me. The hon. Member for Bath's amendment is otiose and unnecessary. It is a wrongly worded way of achieving something that could be brought about much more simply.
 The clause amends section 204 of the 1996 Act, but with highly complicated wording. I had to read it about three times before I understood it—and I am not sure that I fully understood it even then. New section 204(4) will be added to the original section 204. Subsection (3) states that an appeal may not be brought until 
``after the final determination by the county court of the main appeal.'' 
I wonder whether the drafters are in a muddle. They seem to be saying that the main appeal on a point of law has to take place before the subsidiary appeal against detailed aspects of failing properly to operate previous clauses and the review. 
 Subsection (6) states: 
 ``An order under subsection (5) . . . may only be made if the court is satisfied that failure to exercise the section 204(4) power in accordance with the order would substantially prejudice the applicant's ability to pursue the main appeal.'' 
An element of tautology is discernible here. We have already been told under subsection (3) that the final appeal must be brought before the substance appeal, but in subsection (6) it seems to be the other way round.

David Kidney: I have just listened to the hon. Gentleman's account of what subsection (3) says, but it sounded different from the wording in the Bill. He said that the appeal could not be brought ``until'' after the final determination of the main appeal, but it does not say ``until''. Until he realises that, what he said is meaningless.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I accept that. Let me read out subsection (3) for the total avoidance of doubt:
 ``An appeal under this section may not be brought after the final determination by the county court of the main appeal.'' 
In other words, the main appeal has to be heard before the substance appeal. If I am wrong, the Minister will tell me. If I am wrong on subsection (3), I presume that there is no contradiction with subsection (6). Is that what the hon. Gentleman is saying?

David Kidney: It does not matter. When the appeal has been dealt with by the county court, that is it. Time is up.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: We are talking about two appeals: one on a point of law and one on a point of substance. The question is which comes first. The wording of this complicated section 204A is not clear. The Minister may tell me that it is quite clear, but speaking as a layman, I do not believe that it is. Will the Minister explain the procedure in clear, simple English? I shall sit down and allow the Minister to explain it.

Alan Whitehead: I shall attempt to do what the hon. Member for Cotswold (Mr. Clifton-Brown) asks of me before I proceed with clause 11 and the amendment proposed by the hon. Member for Bath.
 I have a little chart that shows that the court may require the local authority to accommodate only if the court has already quashed the local authority's decision not to accommodate and is satisfied that, if the applicant were not accommodated, that would substantially prejudice his ability to proceed. They are not consequent but parallel actions. As the hon. Member for Cotswold said, the county court's determination of the main appeal deals with whether a person should be accommodated while an appeal is taking place. Therefore, what he presents as an apparent sequence of events is in fact not a sequence but a series of parallel developments that ensure not only that the person must have succeeded to some extent in establishing the problem of accommodation, but that the failure to provide accommodation would prejudice the person's ability to continue with the action. The hon. Member for Cotswold is incorrect. I hope that that elucidates a complex issue. 
 On clause 11 and new clause 2, I note the predilection of the hon. Member for Bath for postcards. It is a triumph of consensual democracy that a Bill that was apparently entirely written by Opposition Members and introduced by a Labour Government may be going on the statute books. If they could agree who had written what, our cup would run over. 
 Before I turn to the new clause, I shall explain in some detail the purpose and effect of clause 11. Homeless applicants have the right to appeal to the county court on a point of law about decisions made by the local housing authority that relate to their homelessness application. That right applies when applicants have asked the authority to review a decision that, for example, they do not fall within a priority need group and are dissatisfied with the authority's decision on review, or if the authority has failed to provide a decision in the required period. 
 Authorities may at their discretion continue to secure accommodation for an applicant pending an application to the county court and must take into account the circumstances of each case in deciding whether to exercise that power. Currently, if an applicant wants to challenge an authority's decision not to exercise its power to continue to accommodate, he or she must ask for a judicial review of that decision by the High Court. The High Court has the power to quash the decision if it is unlawful and may require the authority to accommodate the applicant until the application for judicial review can be heard. 
 Clause 11 inserts a new section, 204A, into the Housing Act 1996, and gives the county court powers that are broadly equivalent to current High Court powers to consider decisions made by the housing authority not to accommodate pending an appeal to the county court on a point of law. Therefore, in future, the county court will be able to deal with all aspects of appeals that relate to homelessness decisions and co-ordinate the appeal on the substantive homelessness decision, together with any application to consider the authority's decision not to continue to accommodate. 
 Proposed new section 204A(2) gives applicants the right to appeal to the county court against an authority's decision that results in their not being accommodated for the full period until the final determination of their appeal against the substantive homelessness decision, which I shall refer to as ``the main appeal''. Proposed new section 204A(3) provides that such appeals cannot be brought after the final determination of the main appeal on the homelessness decision, as I said in response to the hon. Member for Cotswold. 
 Proposed new section 204A(4) gives the county court new powers, to which the hon. Member for Bath referred. The court may require the authority to accommodate the applicant for a period before the court hears the appeal against the authority's decision not to accommodate. The court must confirm or quash the decision of the authority that is being appealed against. In considering which to do, it must apply the principles of judicial review that are used in the High Court. If the county court quashes the authority's decision, new section 204A(5) gives the court the power to require the housing authority to accommodate the applicant for a period specified by the court, subject to certain conditions. 
 The conditions are set out in new section 204A(6). First, the court can require the authority to accommodate only if the court is satisfied that a failure to do so would 
``substantially prejudice the applicant's ability to pursue the main appeal''. 
Secondly, an authority cannot be required to continue to accommodate an applicant after their main appeal has been finally determined. Those are the two parallel points that I mentioned earlier. 
 Clause 11 will provide new rights for homeless applicants and new powers for the county court that will enable the court to deal with all aspects of appeals against a local housing authority's decision on a homelessness case, including any decision not to continue to accommodate the applicant pending the appeal. 
 Let me respond to the other point made by the hon. Member for Cotswold by saying that, as far as I can see, the substitution of the word ``must'' for ``may'' would mean that, instead of the local authority having discretion subject to appeal, that discretion would go and the local authority would have to accommodate and therefore go down an entirely different route from the one that I have set out. Far from that change simplifying matters, it would bring in an entirely new meaning. 
 I admire the construction of the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Bath, which has a certain familiarity. He may have hit on a device that could save millions of pounds by taking templates for legislation and dropping new words into them. That could be a productive way to construct our legislation in future. It could lead to mass unemployment, but it might be useful. 
 Clause 11 gives the county court the power to intervene in decisions by housing authorities not to exercise their discretion to continue to accommodate an applicant pending an appeal to the county court under section 204 of the 1996 Act. New clause 2 would give the county court similar powers to intervene in decisions by an authority not to continue to accommodate pending a review by the authority of its decision on the homelessness case. I can see the attraction of the symmetry of provision that the new clause seems to offer when taken with clause 11. However, as with so much in life, the issues are not simple or clear-cut. The two instances are not equivalent, although the hon. Gentleman sought to convince the Committee that they are. 
 A fundamental point is that the homelessness legislation makes clear distinctions between those who have a priority need and those who do not, and between those who have become homeless through no fault of their own and those who, through their own action or inaction, have brought homelessness on themselves. That reflects reality. It is essential to ensure that vulnerable groups—such as those with dependent children and those who are less able than others to look after themselves—have somewhere suitable to live, but it is not practical or reasonable for local housing authorities to have to arrange accommodation for everyone every time that they face having to find a new home. 
 Since its inception in 1977, the homelessness legislation has given housing authorities an immediate duty to secure accommodation for new applicants where there is reason to believe that they are homeless and in priority need—until the authority has had a chance to look into their circumstances and satisfy itself whether they are indeed homeless, whether that was caused by the applicants and whether there is priority need. That interim duty is imposed by section 188 of the 1996 Act. 
 It is right that authorities should have that obligation and that applicants should have the right to ask the authority to review any decision—for example, that they do not have a priority need or that they became homeless intentionally—that goes against their interests. It is also right that authorities should have the discretion to continue to accommodate applicants during a review where there is good reason to do so. 
 Case law, particularly the London Borough of Camden v. Mohammed in the High Court in 1997, has established that authorities must balance the objective of maintaining fairness for homeless persons where it has been decided that no duty is owed to the applicant, and the possibility that the applicant may be right and that depriving them of accommodation may deny them something to which they are entitled. The court also set out clear criteria that authorities must consider when deciding whether to exercise their discretion to continue to accommodate an applicant after the interim duty under section 188 has ended. 
 It is appropriate that discretion as to whether applicants should continue to be accommodated once the authority has completed its detailed inquiries and satisfied itself of the facts of the case should rest with the authority. In the Court of Appeal in the case of Ali v. City of Westminster and Nairne v. London Borough of Camden, which concerned an application for judicial review of a decision by an authority not to exercise its discretion to continue to accommodate, Lord Justice Otton said: 
 ``Local authorities are well used to dealing with these type of cases. They know the circumstances of the applicants, and the range and availability of accommodation in their area. They have policies in place to guide them in exercising their discretion. It is a matter of common sense that such decisions should remain within their ambit, and not the courts.'' 
Of course, there needs to be an avenue of redress for applicants in the event that an authority does not make a proper and reasonable decision—for example, by failing to give due consideration to all circumstances, or perhaps failing to consider them at all. Currently, that route is an application for a judicial review of the authority's decision by the High Court. The hon. Member for Bath may jump to his feet at this point, and insist that that mechanism is too remote and inaccessible for the average homeless applicant. Like the hon. Gentleman, and no doubt all other members of the Committee, I believe in the importance of the principle of access to justice. However, I also believe that it is important that the discretion of housing authorities is not undermined. There is an inherent tension.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: Will the Minister explain why there are two different strands? An appeal against the authority's failure to review properly must go to a judicial review, which is a difficult way to progress to the High Court, but the failure to continue to house an applicant pending that judicial review is a matter for the county court. Why can we not have a step-like approach, which would be normal in law, in which the county court decides both matters in the first instance before progression up through the legal system?

Alan Whitehead: The points of the hon. Member for Bath are similar to that of the hon. Gentleman. There is a tension between the principle that local authorities should have the discretion to decide the proper protection of a person during a review, which is not the same as a judicial review through the High Court, and the right of a person who is challenging that internal review to be able to do that properly and not be disadvantaged by the fact that he or she is deprived of accommodation.
 The route suggested by the hon. Member for Bath provides for an appeal to the county court and it is therefore likely that the discretion would be undermined. The hon. Gentleman made a point against himself when replying to the suggestion of the hon. Member for Cotswold that ``may'' should be replaced by ``must'', in indicating that that would undermine the discretion of the local authority. In attempting to maintain the point supported by Lord Justice Otton that it is desirable for local authorities to exercise their discretion, the Government believe that the rights of a person who is appealing are best maintained by ensuring that the authority retains discretion and, at the same time, allowing a route of judicial review through the High Court, but not by suggesting that an appeal that would become a matter of course should go through a county court.

Don Foster: Before we go through a tortuous, though necessary, discussion, I ask the Minister a simple question. Does he believe that the decision on whether the local authority was right to deny someone accommodation during the review process should be made in a county court—as the Government have accepted for the appeals process—or through judicial review? If he believes that it should be through judicial review, will he explain why the Government believe that judicial review is appropriate for one case and county court for the other?

Alan Whitehead: That is because appeals on the process and on accommodation are not exactly the same.

Don Foster: I did not ask that question.

Alan Whitehead: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would like to clarify his question.

Don Foster: I was trying to separate the debate on the local authority's decision under review or appeal from the issue of whether it is right to deny accommodation. If there is to be a court intervention on that specific question, should the court concerned be the local county court or the High Court through judicial review? If it is not the county court, why does the Minister want one system for appeal and another for review?

Alan Whitehead: As I understand it, that is because the determination of the local authority's discretion in its review should be protected while still allowing for a review process. As the hon. Gentleman has said, the Government have made it clear that it would be in order for appeals on the first part of the process to proceed through the county courts. However, the hon. Gentleman is attempting to provide a symmetry to the proceedings that is unwarranted because of the tension that I described. That is why the processes cannot be symmetrical in the way that he would want.
 Applying to the courts to overturn an authority's decision should be a matter of last resort and considered only when it is clear that the authority has not made a proper decision, and that is also the view of the Court of Appeal. In the case of Nacion v. Brighton and Hove Council, Lord Justice Tuckey said: 
``the provision of temporary accommodation pending appeal (and the same applies pending review) is entirely in the discretion of the council. Where a council...has obviously considered the material factors it is an entirely futile exercise to seek to say that in some way that discretion was wrongly exercised...Applications for judicial review on this basis should be strongly discouraged. It is only in a very exceptional case that there will really be any reasonable prospect of interesting the court by way of judicial review to interfere with the exercise of the very broad discretion which the council have.'' 
Why then are we making provision to improve access to justice by giving powers to the county court to intervene in authorities' discretion to continue to accommodate pending an appeal to the county court but not pending a review by the authority? Why should applicants still have to go to the High Court on that issue pending the review by the housing authority? That question was put by the hon. Member for Cotswold and pursued by the hon. Member for Bath. 
 The answer, put simply, is that there is no overriding need to improve access to the courts in seeking a review of an authority's decision. That course of action should be pursued only in exceptional circumstances, whether it is to the High Court or the county court. However, when an applicant wishes to apply to the court to review a decision not to continue to accommodate at the same time as he or she is making an appeal to the county court on the substantive homelessness decision—that is, for example, that the homelessness was intentional or that there was not a priority need—it does not make sense, either from the perspective of the applicant or the courts, for the two applications to be considered by different courts. 
 Put even more simply, where the county court is considering an appeal under section 204 of the 1996 Act in regard to the homelessness decision, it makes sense that it should also consider any application to review the authority's decision not to exercise its power under section 204(4) to continue to accommodate pending the appeal.

Don Foster: I am disappointed by the Minister's reply. I suggest, as tactfully as possible, that his understanding of the situation—like that of the hon. Member for Cotswold—is somewhat confused. I shall put the situation as simply and succinctly as I can to give the Minister one more opportunity to explain the Government's position.
 The situation is simple. An applicant can request a local authority to review its decision in respect of eligibility or priority. That is an internal review process, which is carried out under the discretion of the local authority. Nothing in my proposal would in any way fetter the local authority in carrying out that review process. However, it matters significantly during the review period whether the applicant has accommodation. In some cases, local authorities will continue to provide accommodation and in others they will not, to the disadvantage of the applicant. It therefore seems sensible for someone to be able to decide whether the local authority is right to refuse to continue accommodation—in respect not of the decision it makes during the review process but merely of its decision not to continue to provide accommodation. 
 The existing law states that there is a right of challenge to the courts, by the process of judicial review to the High Court. My proposed alternative is that, in the specific instance of an appeal against a local authority's decision, the local county court instead be given the opportunity to decide the case. I want a degree of symmetry—for the sake of common sense. The Government used the argument that it is more sensible to use the local county court in deciding to change the appeals procedure. The Government decided that it was crazy to use the High Court for that matter and that the local county court should be used instead.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that access to justice demands quick, clear decisions? The local county court could make a much quicker, clearer decision by hearing in parallel the matter of whether a local authority should continue to house and that of whether the local authority used the correct discretion on its review period. That would create much quicker, clearer justice.

Don Foster: I cannot agree. The hon. Gentleman again confuses the two-stage process of how such matters are considered. I do not want to fetter the right of local authorities to try to sort those matters out themselves first at a local level. Only if they cannot do so should the matter go to court. I am discussing only whether accommodation has rightly or wrongly been denied to a particular applicant for the review process. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that that consideration should be quick and clear but I would go further and say that those aims would be more easily achieved by the local county court, which can take account of local circumstances.
 Those are the very arguments that the Government used in making a decision in respect of the changes that they proposed in the Homes Bill. Even if the Minister is not prepared to accept new clause 2 because I have drafted it in a misleading way, I hope that he would agree that there is strength in the argument that it is better to go to the county court to decide these matters, if a court must be involved, than to go to the High Court through judicial review. That is all I seek. The matter may appear complicated, but that is because the Government complicated the legislation by adding a range of additional categories. I welcome those additions, but the clause must cover all those eventualities. 
 Given that I am prepared to withdraw the new clause, I hope that the Minister will at least agree that he should reconsider that issue.

Alan Whitehead: As the hon. Member for Bath made clear in his earlier contribution, he is pleased that under section 204A the Government have said that when an appeal is before the county court, it is sensible that that court should be able to make a decision on accommodation as well. He accepts that that is a logical step. I sought to persuade him that it is not logical to go a further step when a review is undertaken by the local authority itself and one wants to ensure that the local authority's discretion, with reasonable provision, is upheld.
 As I said before, our position conforms to the opinion of the High Court. That court's opinion emphasised that under those circumstances, attempts to overturn the properly exercised discretion of the local authority in determining whether it should continue to provide accommodation while it reviews whether the interim criteria should be firmed up, need to be preserved. As the hon. Gentleman said, judicial review is a possible remedy that should be used in exceptional circumstances alone and should properly be taken through the High Court. It is not that there is no remedy, but the symmetry that the hon. Gentleman seeks to introduce is not there, and I freely concede that that is the case. However, that symmetry could be achieved only by pulling the tension between a local authority's discretion to review their own activities and the rights of those subject to that discretion to take action if they are dissatisfied with that discretion too far away from the proper exercise of that local authority's discretion. That is the nub of the case. 
 It is not a misunderstanding of what the hon. Gentleman seeks to achieve, but a difference of opinion about how best one proceeds to allow local authorities to exercise their discretion in respect of the review. The Government's position is that the course of judicial review through the High Court is the right course of action, so we cannot accept the new clause.

Don Foster: I am grateful to the Minister for giving way and I promise that I do not intend to intervene again on this matter. Will the Minister tell me what difference it makes to the fettering of the discretion of the local authority in respect of the decision whether to continue to provide housing if the right to challenge that decision is made in the High Court or the county court? Surely in either case there would be a fettering of that discretion by allowing either of those routes to be entered into. I do not understand why one route is considered by the Minister to massively fetter the discretion of the local authority, whereas the other route is not. If there is no difference between the two, surely the symmetry argument comes into play.

Alan Whitehead: As the hon. Gentleman knows—given that he underlined such a point in an earlier contribution—there is a difference. That difference is that judicial review through the High Court is a process to be used in exceptional circumstances. It is not to be used as a routine course of action if the first course of action fails, as has been suggested in some quarters might be the outcome of an appeal through the county court.
 The hon. Member for Cotswold referred to the difficulties that would arise for a local authority if the word ``may'' became ``must''. I suggest that, while the two acts are not exactly parallel, the fact that a person may decide that an appeal to the county court was the routine next step would have the effect, while maintaining a theoretical discretion, of bringing us to the situation where, in effect, ``may'' had been replaced by ``must''. The reality is that, in seeking to maintain that proper space between the right of a local authority to exercise discretion and the right of the individual to seek redress, judicial review through the High Court is the right course of action and that is the approach that the Government wish to take. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Woolas.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at three minutes to Seven o'clock till Thursday 12 July at half-past Nine o'clock.